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To the Bone: Race and White Privilege
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.t
PROLOGUE
Toni Morrison once explained how deeply meaning can be
buried in a text. She was asked where in the text of her novel,
Beloved, Sethe killed the baby. She answered the questioner
by replying confidently that it had happened in a particular
chapter, but when she went to look for it there she-the
author-could not find it. Meanings can be difficult even for
the authors of a text. The same thing is true for the texts
written by the multiple authors of a movement. What did we
mean and where is a particular event or idea located? These
are questions that are difficult for any one person, even
someone who, like myself, has at least been a participant in the
writing of the text. There may be meanings-unintended
meanings-that we who participate are not aware of and it is
important to ferret them out.
Ten years after its formal beginning, critical race theory is
under assault by those inside and outside the legal academy
for supposed ugly things contained within the texts that make
up the body of its work. Our movement has been almost
exclusively a written and spoken community. We have met to
facilitate those words, and the product of those meetings and
that collaboration is strewn among law reviews and books that
have become central to aspects of the legal academy.
Unfortunately, some of our critics have claimed to find within
those multiple-authored multiple texts anti-Semitism, antiwhite, anti-white male, anti-Asian and other uncivil by-

t Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Charles Hamilton
Houston Visiting Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University School
of Law. B.A, University of Chicago; M.A., Harvard University; J.D., Harvard
Law School. I owe thanks in particular to Nancy Levit, Robert Chang, and
Derrick Bell for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this article, and
to my research assistant Christopher Nelson. All remaining errors are my
own.
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products. The critics of critical race theory have attempted to
find this message of hate buried in the clear testament of hope
and a requirement of transformation stated in the pages of the
law reviews and books written by many authors. I do not
believe that an evil message is there and certainly none of the
critics have come close to naming it. These critics do not
understand that there are critical race theories. There are
many theories that unite and divide everyone who could be
accused of being or claim to be members of the critical race
theory movement, but there is a common belief in an opposition
to oppression.
In making this charge the critics of critical race theory
have failed to acknowledge the deeply embedded message of
critical race theory. That message is that race is only skin
deep, but white supremacy runs to the bone.' Race is only skin

1. This is a paraphrase of an old Moms Mabley joke: Beauty is only skin
deep, but ugliness runs to the bone. White supremacy is the idea by the
largely white majority that their culture, ideas, and interpretation of the
world is superior to the nonwhite minority. This majority is not necessarily
exclusively all white. Nonwhite people can support white supremacy just as it
is possible for white people to oppose it. See, e.g., Frances Lee Ansley, A Civil
Rights Agenda for the Year 2000: Confessions of an Identity Politician, 59
TENN. L. REV. 593 (1992). Much of this superiority is structured around the
way that race is constructed as a white/black issue. Michael Goldfield
described the importance of race this way:
Race is the key to unraveling the secret of American exceptionalism,
but it is also much more.... Race has been the central ingredient,
not merely in undermining solidarity when broad struggles have
erupted, not merely in dividing workers, but also in providing an
alternative white male nonclass worldview and structure of identity
that have exerted their force during both stable and confrontational
times.... And race has been behind many of the supposed principles
of American government (most notably states' rights) that are
regarded as sacred by some people today.
MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE COLOR OF POLITICS: RACE AND THE MAINSPRINGS

OF AMERICAN POLITICS 30

(1997). bell hooks put it this way-

In white supremacist society, white people can safely imagine that
they are invisible to black people since the power they have
historically asserted, even now collectively assert over black people
accorded them the right to control the black gaze. As fantastic as it
may seem, racist white people find it easy to imagine that black
people cannot see them if within their desire they do not want to be
seen by the dark Other. One mark of oppression was that black folks
were compelled to assume that mantle of invisibility, to erase all
traces of their subjectivity during slavery and the long years of racial
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deep because it is always a social construction (but a very
important social construction) and the work of critical race
theory is to go beyond the socially constructed boundaries and
is exactly about understanding race's importance but scientific
insignificance.
The second and related part of the construction of critical
race theory is that white supremacy goes to the bone. White
racism in its many guises is deeply buried in the structure of
the law and the legal academy. 2 This view of the world
reverses the way that race has traditionally been seen in the
legal academy. To the traditional legal scholar race, in the
words of Neil Gotanda, is simply formal race-race is
biologically connected and socially insignificant and racism is
something that can only be done by Bull Connor or George
Wallace before his salvation. The racism of proposition 187 or
Amendment 2 in Colorado or the racism that is part of sexism
are not possible. The people of California or Colorado or most
men [white and nonwhite] are simply not racist or sexist. To
the legal world before critical race theory, race went to the
bone, but racism was only skin-connected and deep. The whole
process of critical race theory has been to construct a new and
powerful story. Part of the argument of American legal
scholarship, like Sethe's baby, is dead and haunts our present.
The ghost here is our loyalty to the status quo and a certain
part of liberal theory. Ultimately, the part of liberal theory
and the status quo that we must reject is the white privilege
embedded there. The problem of course is to find it and our
own privilege with it, and to keep it from continuing to haunt
our present.

apartheid, so that they could be better less threatening servants.
bell hooks, Representing Whiteness in the Black Imagination, in DISPLACING
WHITENESS: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CRITICISM 165, 168 (Ruth
Frankenberg ed., 1997).
2. For a historical analysis in support of this point, see GOLDFIELD,
supra note 1; for a political science analysis of white supremacy, see CHARLES
W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT (1997); and for a legal discussion of this
point, see DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992). See also Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward
a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings,1991 DUKE
L.J. 39.
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I. INTRODUCTION: TRADITIONAL ACADEMY'S
RESPONSE TO CRITICAL RACE THEORY
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry in a series of articles
and a new book have written a supposed defense of the
Enlightenment view of knowledge, reason, merit and truth.
With defenders like this the ideas they espoused are in more
trouble than even I, part of apostate "radical multiculturalist"
critical race theory legal academy, ever thought. It is not that
an effective defense of disinterested knowledge could not be
waged, but this poorly researched and written diatribe against
a growing group of scholars of color and some of those allied
with us is not it. I say poorly researched and written
advisedly-not in anger but in truth. When Farber and Sherry
find an idea of the scholars of color discussed in this book they
distort it. 3 When Farber and Sherry defend the ideas of
Western European intellectual history they do so with little
comprehension and no scholarly pretensions. 4 The important
ideas of the Enlightenment are so watered down as to be an
unrecognizable imitation of their original power. 5
The
philosophical ideas expressed in this book and these articles
are to philosophy what lite is to beer. When these ideas had
real power that power stemmed not from universal truth but
from something much more difficult to obtain, the ability to
create a consensus about how to move forward while questioning
the present. That consensus no longer exists, perhaps can
never be reinvigorated, but that does not mean that we cannot
discuss where we are and agree on some common parameters.
Unfortunately, Farber and Sherry cannot help us with this
project, because their apparent intention is to distort and
destroy, not engage.
I will end this essay by trying to engage in a conversation
with those in the academy who would like to deal with race as
an issue. Farber and Sherry claim that they are trying to do
this, but the book and their series of articles are devoid of any
meaningful effort to do so. 6 Farber and Sherry make three
points:
Rather than asking whether radical multiculturalism is good philosophical theory, we prefer to ask whether it is wise politics.... In

3.
4.
5.
6.

See
See
See
See

infra Part II.
infra Part IV.
id.
infra Part V.
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agreeing to debate whether radical multiculturalism provides a viable
political vision, rather than whether it is true, we are in effect
agreeing to fight on the radicals' own terms-perhaps at the risk of
taking on some of their characteristics ourselves.
...
W~e believe that we do share some premises with them, or at
least with many of their sympathizers....
" A valid conception of equality should condemn racism not
only against blacks and Hispanics but also against Asians
and Jews.
" Advocates of equality need to be able to engage in
constructive discussions with each other and to contribute to
public discourse in society at large.
" In order to learn from experience, society should aim for the
fullest possible understanding of the past, fiee from overt
political pressures, and should reject any standard for truth
7
that allows suppression of the memory of genuine suffering.

The problem with these common assumptions is that they
misunderstand critical race theory. With respect to the first
point, critical race theory does not limit its discourse to blacks
and Latinos. We have been among the most integrated of
movements in the legal academy. Indeed we are AfricanAmericans, Korean-Americans,
Chinese-Americans,
and
Japanese-Americans, Latino/as, and Caribbean AfricanAmericans, Christian, Buddhist, Moslem and Jew and
nonbelievers. Of course, since we understand the difficulty of
essentialism we do not believe that because we are all of these
things that we are not necessarily racist, anti-Asian, antiSemitic, or anti-black. If you read the substance of what we
have written, however, you cannot find evidence of this in the
central body of our work. Farber and Sherry can only see us as
black and Hispanic and cannot see the multiple texture of our
movement and its confrontation with law and the legal
academy.
With respect to the second point the authors do not engage
the very authors in critical race theory who have most clearly
tried to engage in a discourse. Farber and Sherry would
replace that discourse with a coerced agreement on what is
important. If critical race theory agreed that the racial status
quo is good, that concedes the key intellectual contest. Farber
and Sherry fail to discuss this issue.8

7. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 50 (1997).

8. See infra Part IV.
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I am still baffled by what Farber and Sherry mean by the
last point. As I understand critical race theory we want to talk
about the reality of racial suffering. Farber and Sherry seem
to believe that they do not need to discuss real suffering and
that we can simply replace that history of suffering with a
celebration of assumed truths. Brown is unassailable. Law is
good.
Supreme Court Justices are in general racially
wonderful. These views are barely defensible, but they are not
mandated as the only way to have a real discussion about race.
Farber and Sherry also write,
We do not, however, bring this argument [criticizing critical race
theory] forward without misgivings. The people whose views we
criticize are, after all, earnestly seeking to remedy some of the worst
injustices of our society. Given our liberal Jewish backgrounds, we
feel a particular sense of discomfort in attacking the work of
progressive minority scholars, or of seeming to reopen old wounds
between the Jewish and black communities. Moreover, we have a
strong distaste for the growing incivility of academic disputes. 9

I do not think you can read what I or other critical race
theorists have done as being an effort to represent the
communities of color in conflict with the Jewish communities.
I would argue that raising this question without more evidence
suggests an antipathy that I have not seen in the many critical
race theory, Latcrit, and people of color conferences I have
attended over the last ten years. It is almost as if they are
saying they must be talking about us-what else is there. In
addition, what does it mean to be liberal on the race question.
I would not describe Professor Sherry necessarily as a racial
liberal. Consider the following statement:
Aleinikoff, in his eagerness to empathize with the victims of racism,
completely overlooks the victims of sexism. Similarly, his description
of the young black man who felt resentful when a white woman with
a baby crossed the street to avoid him naturally invites a comparison:
he fears for his emotional well-being, but she fears for her physical
safety. I, at least, would rather be snubbed than raped.10

She does not seem to be able to see racial oppression. As far as
I can tell there is very little difference on the race question
between Newt Gingrich and Farber and Sherry. They have a
right to believe what they want, but it does not make them
liberals on race issues even "if' they are liberal on other issues.

9. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 13-14.
10. Suzanna Sherry, The Forgotten Victims, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 375, 375
(1992).
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It ought to be clear that one need not be a liberal to be a
good person, but I am not sure I find the supposed liberalism in
the public discourse of Farber and Sherry in the general
discourse about race. As a Hubert Humphrey democrat I find
the notion that they are liberals not supportable by the
evidence."
One question should be addressed before I begin. If this
book and the articles are so poorly researched and written, why
pay attention to them? Unfortunately, much of the traditional
legal academy takes these views expressed in books and
articles seriously. Several important federal judges have
reviewed the book and found it important, helpful and
accurate. 12 Reviews by the important opinion makers of our
society have appeared in the New York Times, Wall Street
Journal, and New Republic. I do not believe they stand alone
outside of or inside the legal academy. Some of my colleagues
are likely to see Farber and Sherry's book as the final useful
word on critical race theory. Because this view will hamper the
potential for critical race theories to change the profession, I
will take the criticisms-even though not seriously executedseriously. 3 I hope that those who want to engage on race-11. For a useful defense of similar Enlightenment principles see
CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, RECLAIMING TRUTH: CONTRIBUTION TO A CRITIQUE OF
CULTURAL RELATIVISM (1996). Norris is wrong but his defense is important

and serious.
12. See Alex Kozinski, Bending the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at 46
("While traditional liberals still dominate the law schools in terms of numbers,
they are mostly a cowardly lot, unwilling to risk their peaceful careers to tell
the alarming truth to the world outside. In writing this book, Farber and
Sherry have taken a personal risk. If those of us outside the academy fail to
take heed, we will not be able to say we were not warned."); Richard A.
Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40. Alex Kozinski
and Richard Posner are judges on the Ninth and the Seventh Circuits.
13. In this essay I am going to treat Farber and Sherry's book and the
reviews by Judges Posner and Kozinski as part of the same criticism of critical
race theory. However, sometimes slight differences exist. Farber and Sherry
argue that they do not want to kick critical race theorists out of the legal
academy. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 8 ("We don't want to drive
these scholars out of the law school world; we would be happy, however, if
they abandoned what we think is the least fruitful and most troublesome part
of their message."). But see Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., You Can Take Them
to Water but You Can't Make Them Drink: Black Legal Scholarship and White
Legal Scholars, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (arguing that stories differ in
how the white majority in the academy will hear them). They simply wish to
have critical race theorists reform. But Judge Posner writes in his review:
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whether they agree or disagree with me or others who do
critical race theory-can begin to do so.
II. DISTORTIONS, LAW AND RATIONALITY
Dyslexia: Abnormal difficulty in reading and spelling, caused by a
brain condition.
-OXFORDl AMERICAN DICTIONARY 269 (Herald Colleges ed. 1980)

Farber and Sherry have developed a strange intellectual
affliction. I term it intellectual dyslexia. Dyslexics-of which I
am one-have difficulty with numbers and letters. They
transpose them. So a dyslexic may read red for bed or 453
instead of 534. This problem can be adjusted for and often is
by the dyslexic. She will check her interpretation or go back to
make sure that the numbers or letters that she wrote down
were in fact correct. Farber and Sherry seem to suffer from the
first part of this problem, but have achieved no countervailing
mechanisms that check their inability to read with any care.
Maybe it is my own dyslexia that makes them read words I
write out of context, but it is not confined to my work. The
work and words of most critical race theorists are distorted
beyond recognition. Like the dyslexic, Farber and Sherry often
By exaggerating the plight of the groups for which they are the
self-appointed spokesmen, the critical race theorists come across as
whiners and wolf-criers.
By forswearing analysis in favor of
storytelling, they come across as labile and intellectually limited. By
embracing the politics of identity, they come across as divisive. Their
grasp of social reality is weak; their diagnoses are inaccurate; their
suggested cures (rigid quotas, 1960s-style demonstrations, transformations of the American spirit, socialism, poverty law practice) are
tried and true failures. Their lodgment in the law schools is a disgrace
to legal education, which lacks the moral courage and the intellectual
self-confidence to pronounce a minority movement's scholarship bunk.
To be sure, it is not a unique embarrassment; there is plenty of shoddy
legal scholarship. But this is hardly an excuse for the extremism, the
paranoia, the hysteria, and the irrationalism of critical race theory,
which are embarrassments to sober liberal egalitarians, such as
Farber and Sherry, and obstacles to solving the problems created by
the nation's racial and ethnic variety.
Posner, supra note 12, at 43. Judge Posner seems to argue for the elimination
of critical race theory from the academy. In their book, Farber and Sherry,
despite their protestation to the contrary, seem to call for our intellectual
execution, and that is exactly what Judges Posner and Kozinski call for in
their reviews.
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see on the pages of articles what they hope is there, not what is
written. Beyond All Reason, a book published by a famous
academic press, is so full of misstatements and distortions that
literally no statement can be taken at face value. Many of you
who have not read and are not likely to read the work of
critical race scholars are likely to think that I overstate this
point. I do not. As proof of this point I am going to note
several of their significant distortions.
The least useful part of their argument is the effort to
make critical race theory anti-Semitic. Farber and Sherry
make most of their criticism of Derrick Bell in two places. One
argument is that in his Space Traders story 14 he is unfair to
Jews. As a small part of the story of the Space Traders,
Professor Bell argues that in response to a fictional outer-space
alien offer to trade African-Americans for economic progress, a
group of Jews set up the Anne Frank Committee. As a militant
group they offered to provide comfort to runaway AfricanAmericans. The plan is not successful in the story because of
the scapegoating of Jews and virulent anti-Semitism in the
white community in response to those Jews who are part of the
Anne Frank Committee. But what outrages Farber and Sherry
is the statement in the story by Professor Bell that "[a] concern
of many Jews not contained in their official condemnations of
the Trade offer, was that, in the absence of blacks, Jews could
become the scapegoats." 5 Farber and Sherry conclude that
this means that Jewish support is "rooted firmly in group selfinterest, and a rather ugly interest at that-for it appears that
sure that blacks remain
what the Jews really need is to be 16
available as targets for white racism."
There are two parts to this claim. One is that Professor
Bell is unfair to the Jewish communities who have often been
political allies and supporters of the claims of AfricanAmerican communities. The second is that Professor Bell's
telling of this story suggests that not all of the support that
came from those Jewish communities or individuals was
altruistic. Actually Farber and Sherry seem to read this even
more negatively. They seem to suggest that none of what the

14. The Space Traders stories appear in two of Professor Bell's books. See
BELL, supra note 2; DERRICK BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS (1996).
15. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 25.
16. Id. at 26.
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Jewish community has done historically or would do in this
instance was altruistic as Professor Bell tells the story.
This seems a distortion of Professor Bell's story. The
moral of his story seems to be that the people in the Jewish
communities who believe that they might be next are right
since they are subject to hideous harm because of their support
of black people. That message seems to me to be the antithesis
of anti-Semitism. 17 The Jewish community has enemies and
they are not among critical race scholars. The reading of the
word "many" as "all" by Farber and Sherry seems just a pure
distortion and an effort to take out of context Professor Bell's
larger argument. Their reading of any criticism of the motives
of a group they are members of as an attack on their bona fides
also is a distortion.
Farber and Sherry see this part of Professor Bell's story as
questioning the commitment by any Jew to racial justice. 18 I do
not believe that is a reasonable interpretation of the story.
Professor Bell clearly believes that history suggests that such
concern by Jews and other supportive whites has not been
enough to eliminate racism, but that claim is clearly not antiSemitic. Professor Bell's story is no more harsh on liberal
whites than it is on progressive blacks, and no more harsh on
Jews than it is on Gentiles. In that sense Professor Bell has
taken the Jewish support of civil rights very seriously.
The issue of anti-Semitism comes up most viscerally in
their reaction to Professor Bell's arguments about Louis
Farrakhan. Professor Bell suggests, as have a number of
people both black and white, Jew and Gentile, that some of
what Louis Farrakhan has been criticized for has been taken
17. Farber and Sherry in their contribution to this symposium claim that
my analysis of Professor Bell's work is inconsistent with the "standard
conceptual apparatus of radical multiculturalism.

There is no talk here of

deep social structures, ingrained cultural attitudes, mindsets, or unconscious
biases." Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Beyond All Criticism?,83 MINN.
L. REV. 1735, 1757 (1999). As always, Farber & Sherry get it wrong. I start
off this section by making clear that I believe that anti-Semitism is a real and
important problem. I note that all of our biases should be analyzed. This
sounds like exactly the type of analysis that I have required of them, Richard
Posner, and other traditional scholars. I do not claim that I or Professor Bell
are free of hidden biases. I criticize Professor Bell for being too supportive of
Farrakhan. In short, I do everything that they claim I do not. They fail to
point out in my work or the work of Professor Bell the anti-Semitism that
they suggest lurks unexamined in our work. It is exactly their failure to point
out such hidden attitudes that mark their book and this response.
18.

See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 4.
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out of context. Bell also argues that there is a form of white
privilege involved in the requirement that every black person
must start with a criticism of Farrakhan and a plan to do
something about him before their statements can or will be
heard. Neither argument is anti-Semitic. Professor Bell may
be wrong about how to face anti-Semitism, but he is very upfront about his plan and his opposition to all the many evils of
anti-Semitism. Professors Farber and Sherry seem to believe
that they have an exclusive right to tell the story of Jewish
Is Professor Bell's refusal to condemn
discrimination.
Farrakhan misplaced? I think so, 19 but I think he explains his
rationale in terms that are clearly not anti-Semitic. Farber
and Sherry do not engage his point about Farrakhan's words
It is as if after Louis
and his point about privilege.
Farrakhan's name is spoken nothing else is visible but
Farrakhan's anti-Semitism. No reasoned discussion seems
possible once that social construction that Louis Farrakhan
has become is invoked.
The second distortion is from Farber and Sherry's criticism
words. In summing up the supposed reaction of critical
my
of
race scholars to those black scholars who hold different views,
Farber and Sherry write:
Any story that is inconsistent with multiculturalist views can be
knocked out-either the storyteller is not an authentic member of the
group, or his perceptions have been warped by the dominant culture.
So it doesn't matter, for example, what Yale law professor Stephen
Carter may have to say about the effects of affirmative action in his
own life, or what Justice Clarence Thomas may have to say about his
experiences. They are merely, in Jerome [McCristall Culp's terms,
black men in white face. 0

Farber and Sherry's only citation for this phrase is to an article
that I wrote entitled Black People in White Face:Assimilation,

19. I agree with Louis Farrakhan's critics that there is a significant
element of anti-Semitism in many of his statements and actions. However, I
disagree with Professor Bell that the use of categories of speech and antiSemitism is justified as part of the response to the real racism that exists.
Any use of the racial categories to build on oppression whether it is gender,
sexual orientation, class, or racial or ethnic is not only wrong, but it is likely
to not help in the liberation of those being liberated. Nevertheless, it is a far
cry from that difference to an assertion that Farrakhan's statements and
actions are rooted in anti-Semitism. That underlying principle is not justified
anywhere in Farber and Sherry's critique of Professor Bell.
20. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 128.
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Culture, and the Brown Case.21 My article is about the
question of assimilation for all black people and indirectly all
people of color. In none of the several articles I have written
have I ever accused Clarence Thomas or Stephen Carter of
being in white face. Farber and Sherry misunderstand how I
and critical race theory view assimilation. In a complex society
assimilation happens to all of us, or white male Duke students
would not have started wearing baseball caps backwards and
black rap groups would not wear Duke and University of North
Carolina shirts in their videos. So when I have written about
assimilation I have never singled out particular individuals
who assimilated. I have noted my own assimilation in at least
one article and suggested my own ambivalence regarding its
22
worth.
Assimilation is a complicated issue, and I and other
critical race theorists have dealt with that complication with
some care. But Farber and Sherry read into critical race
theory the claim that everyone who is assimilated is a
caricature of black people, in Farber and Sherry's term "black
men in white face." Now I use Farber and Sherry's term
advisedly because they have taken my term, which I borrowed
from Kenneth M. Stampp, to mean something antithetical to
how I use it.23 Since I imported the term to legal discourse and
its colorful style has been the product of chiefly my work, I
believe it is fair to argue that they do a disservice to my term
and its use in this book. Farber and Sherry do try to make the
argument that a few passing criticisms of Clarence Thomas
and some other "conservative" blacks by Professor Bell
amounts to saying that they are duped or not black and

21. See id. at 182 (citing Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Black People in White Face:
Assimilation, Culture, and the Brown Case, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 670
(1995)).
22. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., The Michael Jackson Pill: Equality,
Race and Culture, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2613 (1994).
23. See KENNETH M. STAmPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAvERY IN
THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH, at vii (1956) ("I did not, of course, assume that
there have been, or are today, no cultural differences between white and black
Americans. Nor do I regard it as flattery to call Negroes white men with
black skins. It would serve my purpose as well to call Caucasians black men
with white skins."); see also FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN WHITE MASKS: THE
EXPERIENCES OF A BLACK MAN IN A WHITE WORLD (Charles Lam Markmann
trans., 1967). Fanon's book was originally published in French under the title
PeauNoire, Masques Blancs.
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therefore are in white face. This is a distortion of what
Professor Bell wrote. In Faces at the Bottom of the Well, on the
pages cited by Farber and Sherry, Professor Bell explains one
of his rules of racial standing. He does criticize Justice
Thomas's appointment in these words:
Given Thomas's modest academic background, relative youth, lack of
litigation experience, and undistinguished service in appointive
government positions, only his 'enhanced standing,' in accordance
with the Third Rule, as a well-known critic of affirmative action and
civil rights policies and leaders in general could have won him
with more
priority over the multitude of lawyers, white and black,
24
traditional qualifications for a seat on our highest Court.

This argument about Justice Thomas's modest credentials
does not mean that he has said that Justice Thomas is in white
face, but he is arguing that taking certain views raises the
visibility of racial minorities in the white community. They are
the black people who are heard by the white community. I
have made similar arguments. 25 Since white face is how the
white community sees black people, it may be that Farber and
Sherry believe that Justice Thomas, by adopting certain views,
has become white. Certainly that is the only way to make
sense of a similar suggestion made by Farber and Sherry that
black scholars cannot represent urban poor blacks because
they are by definition not part of poverty. 26 This seems to be

24. See BELL, supra note 2, at 115.
25. See Culp, supra note 13, at 1022.
26. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of
School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 817 (1993).
Farber and Sherry write:
In addition, it would be helpful to have a more complete
explanation of how black law school professors-whose occupation
confers social and economic privilege, and who may come from
privileged backgrounds similar to their white counterparts'--have a
special claim to represent the views of poor blacks in urban ghettos.
Indeed, there is evidence that they do not fully share the views of
most African Americans. Stephen Carter points out that while most
critical race theorists are politically to the left of their academic
colleagues, most studies show African Americans to be considerably
more conservative than whites on many issues. This suggests that
perhaps only a minority of African Americans truly speak with a
political voice of color.
See id. (citations omitted).
They seem to be convinced that they can speak as Americans or as
members of the legal academy despite its heterogeneous nature, but that
people of color are either black or members of the academy. It ought to be
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the heart of Farber and Sherry's claim that nonwhite critics of
the status quo should be guided by these "conservative" figures
in the black community chosen by the white majority to speak
for us. When we choose to examine the opinions and the ideas
of those people for their content our criticism becomes ugly
instead of just pointed. This is also true of their criticism of
Professor Derrick Bell for comparing the appointment of
Justice Thomas to the elevation of black overseers who are
willing to mimic the master's views. Professor Bell follows that
quote with a careful analysis of Clarence Thomas and Booker
T. Washington and the way that some white people understand
the stories told by black people. This analysis engages the
effort of Clarence Thomas to deal with race. It does not
dismiss his views out of hand or say that because he disagrees
with Professor Bell he has nothing worth saying. Professor
Bell questions the logic and sense of Justice Thomas's position.
Professor Bell makes another point here that is important.
Louis Harlan has reminded us that despite his public
pronouncements, privately Booker T. Washington was a racial
radical fighting lynching, disenfranchisement, peonage, educational discrimination, and segregation. The mask that
Washington was forced to put on did not permit him to publicly
take positions that he privately knew were right. The notion of
outsiders having to put on such masks is neither new nor novel
and it is not name-calling to note their existence. When is a
conservative position a mask and when is it a well thought-out
alternative to the conventional wisdom? It is always hard to
tell, and it is clear that Farber and Sherry don't know the
difference.
However, by calling my name in the text and citing my
article Farber and Sherry make me the poster child for this
simplistic version of assimilation, but they do not cite or quote
what I actually wrote about assimilation. Instead, they subclear that they would not ask the same question of white American privilege
that they ask of scholars of color. Furthermore, when Farber and Sherry
accuse the nonwhite professors of being "privileged," they assume a nonracial
nature to "privilege" that is not supported by the racial reality. After all we
know that in 1960-when many of the nonwhite professors now in the
academy were growing up-a black person who graduated from college made
less than a white person who graduated from high school. In the United
States, privilege has always been racialized. Therefore, a black "privileged"
person had more limited housing, school, and business choices. Farber and
Sherry cannot understand this concern because they live in a world of
blindness to that racial reality.
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stitute their version of what I meant. The following is what I
wrote about white face:
This requirement of black assimilation is akin to a requirement that
black people put on white face and is ultimately unacceptable as a
goal for a decolonized African American community. This desire for
assimilation promotes the conclusion that it is permissible to create
white culture but dangerous to have black culture on campuses or in
the curriculum because it will politicize our universities. I call this
misconception of the Brown orthodoxy the "assimilation assumption."
... When the students at the University of North Carolina sought
to have a black cultural center placed at the heart of the college
campus, in the only open space left near the center of campus, their
Editorials
demands were seen as militant and inappropriate.
denounced them for their effrontery of wanting to make some part of
the University of North Carolina respond to black concerns. What
caused this anger at the effort of black students to make themselves
participants in the university's activities? The only plausible answer
is that many participants in the civil rights struggle, important and
able participants, thought that black people were agreeing to a
"neutral principle" of assimilation. Black students would become
white students with black faces and our college campuses would not
change at all. The issues we discuss, the concerns we emphasize, and
the programs we administer would remain the same, only the
complexions of some in the classroom and perhaps at the podium
would be altered. 27

Nowhere in these two quotes are individuals criticized for
assimilating and neither are the views of black critics
dismissed because they disagree with me. I have tried to
engage the words of Professor Carter, Thomas Sowell, and
Clarence Thomas on a number of occasions, but I have never
tried to dismiss them as simply exemplars of assimilation or as
conservatives out of step with the "real" black community. Nor
would I, since for me assimilation is a question all of us face
every day. I would be dishonest if I did not admit that I
sometimes assimilate nonblack culture into my life. In my
work I am questioning the nature and the necessity of
assimilation as a simple panacea for racism. 28
27. Culp, supra note 21, at 669-70, 679 (citations omitted). Farber and
Sherry suggest in their response that my interpretation of assimilation refers
to an earlier article, but the citation that is quoted in the text of this article
and (in part) in their response is from the original article that they claimed
proved that I am opposed to all assimilation. See Farber & Sherry, supra note
17, at 1742. What are they talking about? They seem not to have read my
article originally and still haven't.
28. Indeed if they had read my articles they would have seen that I wrote
something quite different about Stephen Carter. See Jerome McCristal Culp,
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The William and Mary article argues that many of the
"good" people who helped to make Brown were under a
misperception that black people had agreed to complete
assimilation in agreeing to or seeking the redress that Brown
brought. The article questions that common assumption about
Brown and integration. The article praises the many people
who fought for Brown. Its rejection of what I call the assimilation assumption is troubling to many people, but Farber
and Sherry don't attack or support that assumption. They
instead attack me for something that I did not write and do not
believe. Farber and Sherry seem to have read the title of my
article and come to a conclusion about what it must have
meant. They assume that I must be attacking those black
people who have assimilated. The point of my article is that a
decolonized African-American community must have at least
the power to choose. Communities of color require the power to
assimilate or to reject assimilation or even more powerfully to
sometimes assimilate and sometimes not, and critical race
theory requires the possibility of nonwhite people to be able to
create additional possibilities outside the straitjacket of the
status quo. 29 This denial of the freedom to not assimilate
seems to me to be the real totalitarianism that is involved in
race relations in America. Even Clarence Thomas and certainly Stephen Carter might agree with me on that issue.
In Black People in White Face,30 I am worried about the
much larger question of what assimilation means to legal
Jr., Water Buffalo and Diversity: Naming Names and Reclaiming the Racial
Discourse, 26 CONN. L. REV. 209, 229 (1993) (noting that Professor Carter is

misunderstood by some in the white male professorate when he looks at merit
and selection of law professors). But see Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 U. IOWA L.
REV. 145 (1994) (arguing for a simplistic cure by assimilation for racial and
ethnic ills).
29. Choice is sometimes problematic. True freedom would include
something more than just choice. True freedom for the African-American
community would include the right and power to participate in the creation of
the choices. It is the failure to permit that option that is part of what critical
race theory is all about.
30. See supra note 21. Farber and Sherry in their response to my
criticism of their work have suggested that I could not have meant
(originally?) what I have written in this response. They write, "Culp argues
that he is 'ambivalent' about assimilation, and that his use of that phrase is
meant only to express that ambivalence. This is an unlikely interpretation:
the whole point of the metaphor seems to be that assimilated blacks are as
inauthentic as whites wearing blackface .... " Farber & Sherry, supra note
17, at 1742.
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theory. White face is that comfortable spot where white people
try to put black people. I do not believe that very many black
people see themselves in exactly that way, and my guess is
that Professor Carter and Justice Thomas have much more
complicated views about who they are. But I have successfully
tried to avoid guessing about what they might think and tried
to deal with what they wrote. If you examine the pages of the
multiple texts that are critical race theory, there is some
criticism of blacks, Asians, and whites who disagree with our
project, but that disagreement is with the substance of what
they are arguing. Farber and Sherry want to elevate those
blacks, Asians, and Latino/as who disagree with our project to
a status outside discourse.
Farber and Sherry and most of the legal academy ask the
wrong question. They say to critical race theory, how can you
represent the poor and racial perspectives that are not
represented when there are multiple perspectives and identi-

As I have suggested in this section, that is not what I meant originally or
now. Farber and Sherry display a unique arrogance in concluding that their
interpretation is the "right" one. They seem unable to engage in the civil
discourse about real differences. Instead, they create their own strained
interpretations of what others have said and then nash and wail about the
consequences of their interpretations. It is particularly odd for two scholars
who identify themselves as members of a religious (cultural?) minority to
assume that assimilation is a one way street. The history of Jews, like other
minorities, is full of examples of the balancing of assimilation and difference.
Is it hard for Farber and Sherry to accept this interpretation by a black
person because once blacks have formal equality no difference is permissible
or because race for them is about cultural "inferiorities" so that black
difference is always about those bad characteristics? I don't know the answer
to that question, but I do know they cannot read with care what I and others
have said.
Those who don't know me may think that I am a black nationalist given
the Farber and Sherry reading of my work. I do not believe a fair reading
would permit such an interpretation. Critical race scholars like myself can be
criticized for believing too much in assimilation given the rewards it provides
to minority communities, but we are not a simplistic version of the Black
Panthers no matter how much Farber and Sherry would like us to be. Despite
Farber and Sherry's claim that I have run from what I have written, I accept
it. Could I have written it more clearly? Perhaps I might have changed "a" to
"the" in the quote they cite, but the point is they didn't read the article at all.
The article is not an attack on blacks who assimilate. The article challenges
the assumption of assimilation imposed on blacks by the society in general.
Farber and Sherry cannot see the difference. It is a criticism of a goal.
Farber and Sherry are so sure that the goal they share with much of the
academy (color blindness) is the only possible or permissible goal that they
cannot understand that someone might carefully criticize it. I am sorry for
their students who must have their examinations read so ineptly.
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ties in the communities of color. The answer to those questions
requires some care, but the problem is no more difficult than it
is for a member of the House of Representatives who does not
have much in common with her constituents but can still
represent their views and may even be part of that
heterogeneous district. Or the rich white woman law professor
who claims to be able to understand the position of poor women
or black women when she speaks for women. The right
question is the race question. Here the race question is: Do the
ghosts of our racial past affect how black and other nonwhite
people-Asians, Native Americans, Latinos-present themselves to the white majority? How much does the majority
assumption mentioned above distort the discourse of people of
color? In Farber and Sherry's world that question cannot be
asked, because for them race is defined by not being white.
Since race is only a negation of whiteness, black people or other
nonwhite people do not have the freedom to construct an
identity. Either black people become white people or they are
not white people. The right to create an identity resides only
in white people. In that sense for Richard Posner, Colin Powell
is white. Critical race theory rejects that construction of
identity. Cohn Powell can be partially assimilated and partially not and always be a black person.
If people of color can construct their own identity not tied
to whiteness, then the question of how much, if any, the
discourse is distorted by the demand of the empowered
majority (or as in South Africa a minority) to structure the
debate is the race question. If white face is put on, in Farber
and Sherry's terms, it is when people of color change their
discourse to win a case, avoid a political defeat or personal
danger. I cannot accuse someone of being in white face because
it is always obscured by the white supremacy that requires or
rewards it. Our inability to measure how much the discourse
is distorted obviously does not and probably cannot change the
reality of that distortion. Because the voice is distorted does
not mean that what is advocated by those distorted voices is
wrong, but it does mean that we cannot use it to represent
what Asians, Native Americans, Latinos and AfricanAmericans "actually" believe. We also cannot use one part of
the spectrum of views of communities of color to bludgeon the
discussion to that consensus. If the views are a mask, they
have already been distorted by white supremacy. Farber and
Sherry do not confront what Stephen Carter and Clarence
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Thomas claim about race any more than they confront the
views of critical race theories. Race and identity for them are
just mirrored images of the white face. White face for me is
always an obscuring of our certainty about discourse's
intellectual honesty and integrity. For Farber and Sherry
white face is what black people become when they deviate from
the supposed line of black critics of the status quo. The term
white face as used by Farber and Sherry is not mine or critical
race theory's. It is always just Farber and Sherry's.
The power of this distortion to be misunderstood is
exemplified by the apparent use made of it by Judge Posner in
his review of Farber and Sherry's book. He wrote:
[Critical race theory] is not primarily comical, and in fact it has an
ugly streak. Its practitioners attack conservative blacks as white
men with black faces (or as slaves "willing to mimic the masters'
3
views," which is Derrick Bell's description of Clarence Thomas). '

It seems clear that this reference to calling black conservatives
(query is Stephen Carter a conservative) white men with black
faces must be attributable to my article. As I suggested above
this quote stems from a misunderstanding of what I and the
heart of critical race theory have written about black people
who disagree with some of what we have written. Judge
Posner apparently has simply imported the misreading of my
work by Farber and Sherry into his own. He does not feel the
need to be careful or thorough about the work of these scholars
of color because he still believes-as a I criticized him for a
number of years ago-that they (scholars of color) cannot
possibly have anything to teach him.
But this is the heart of the danger posed by a book like
this. Written to appease the conservative thirst to smite the
infidels who have gathered in their temples this book simply
has only the barest pretensions of the objectivity or the
thoroughness that they require of others. It poses the danger
that others will rely on it as the basis of their opinions of
critical race theory. I believe that our work deserves better
and more careful attention. It is a danger that Richard Posner
demonstrates in his review.
A third example of distortion by Farber and Sherry is their
criticism of Professor Patricia Williams' Benneton story. The
Benneton story has been retold in a number of places by
Professor Williams and it has strong bona fides in a number of

31. Posner, supra note 12, at 41.
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disciplines. The story is about the interaction of her race,
shopping, and white power. Farber and Sherry criticize this
story for not having a moral:
Radical multiculturalists seem quite confident about the meaning
of the story, but their confident readings are at odds....
The absence of a clear analytic framework can make it difficult for
If the story has no
stories to contribute to public debate.
ascertainable point, it is impossible for anyone to know whether to
agree or disagree. Instead, the story merely lies on the table, offering
an aesthetic experience like a coffee-table ornament.

Farber and Sherry note that this story has been the subject of
much discussion by critical race theorists and feminists. It also
has been used by literary theorists and social theorists on race.
They have interpreted the story in a number of ways. Farber
and Sherry find that these interpretations of Professor
Williams' story are inconsistent and therefore that there is no
moral to the story. It evidently did not occur to Farber and
Sherry that there could be multiple consistent meanings. A
story may have many meanings. In fact, the more powerful the
story the more meanings that may exist. Those multiple
meanings need not be inconsistent, but more importantly their
inconsistencies can help us understand where the hidden
disagreements are. This multilayered and powerful story has a
long history in African-American literature. One important
33
example is W. E. B. Du Bois's The Souls of Black Folk.
To see the power of this point outside of critical race theory
one only has to consider the most important law and economics
article ever written-The Problem of Social Cost, by R. H.
Coase.3 4 The power of that article was the story embedded in
its message about externalities, social cost, pigovian taxes, and
the role of government. The article led to what has been called
the Coase Theorem, but the meanings of this article are

32. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 85-86.
33. See W. E. B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK x-xi (Random House
1993) (1903). In the introduction to the 1993 edition Arnold Rampersad wrote
that "Du Bois admitted in 1904, a year after publication, that 'the style and
workmanship' of his book did not make its meaning 'altogether clear'. He
believed that the collection conveyed 'a clear central message', but that
around this center floated 'a penumbra' of vagueness and half-veiled
allusions." Id.
34. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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multiple, perhaps inconsistent, and unclear.35 The most
important idea in the article and the idea named after the
author is never clearly stated by him. Did Coase mean to
argue for more or less governmental involvement in the
market? In the article Coase does not explain. 36 As a result
many scholars have attributed multiple meanings to his work.
Farber and Sherry do not believe that Professor Williams can
be sophisticated enough to bury deep and multiple meanings in
her work. They distort her story and make it incomprehensible. This lack of clarity is created by their search for an
imitation of meaning in Professor Williams' work instead of
what is actually there.
Meaning to Farber and Sherry is singular, devoid of depth
and texture. In the real world important meanings must have
such depth or they will disappear. Farber and Sherry don't
argue against the multiple meanings of The Problem of Social
Cost or numerous important articles in the legal academy and
outside.
Another example of distortion by Farber and Sherry is
their defense of the moderate middle:
The standard radical multiculturalist complaint about the legal
system is that judges are formalists who avidly believe in color
blindness and ignore the historical and social contexts of legal issues.
This is a fairly apt characterization of Justices Thomas and Scalia, a
few prominent federal court of appeals judges, and a handful of
conservative academics.
...[L]egal pragmatism ... commands the allegiance of legal
thinkers ranging from Judge Richard Posner on the Right to
Harvard's Frank Michelman on the Left.... Pragmatists are
notorious believers in 37sensitivity to context, history, and openness to
empirical information.

The problem with this distortion of critical race theory is that
they cite to no article that represents this "standard radical
multiculturalist complaint."38 There is a good reason for this.
It is a complete distortion of the position of critical race theory
35. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL. STUD. 1, 14
(1982).
36. See R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 159 (1988)

("Even those sympathetic to my point of view have often misunderstood my
argument, a result which I ascribe to the extraordinary hold which Pigou's
approach has had on the minds of modem economists.").
37. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 131-32.

38. Id.
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and the majority of the legal profession on the Supreme Court.
The central argument made by critical race theory is to
criticize some of the assumptions of the standard model held by
most people in the legal academy.
To take just one example, I demonstrated with quotes from
Richard Posner on the right and Paul Brest on the left that the
vast majority of legal scholars accept an assumption about race
and color blindness that I think is not true. 39 That assumption
is that race is somehow a poor measure of disadvantage and
that there are always better ways to measure it (class, income,
other measures of economic disadvantage). I demonstrated
that this view is held by Justice O'Connor and the center of the
current Supreme Court. This criticism is not an attack on the
periphery of the Court or on dissents by the Court's minority.
It is a criticism at the heart of how the Court faces race and
discrimination in the law.4 0 Much of critical race theory is a
criticism of the liberal majority in the academy.4 1 Why do
Farber and Sherry not deal with the work of critical legal
scholars who criticize the very heart of traditional racial and
constitutional scholarship? How can an important press
publish a book without any citation to support such a charge?
How can the people who reviewed this book for publication,
who presumably were experts in the field, not have known that
this discussion of critical race theory was wrong? Is it that the
people who reviewed this book for Oxford Press have never
read the articles that would refute the points suggested by
Farber and Sherry? There is no way to tell from what is
presented. What we do know is that Farber and Sherry fail
their scholarly requirements.

39. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the
Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading As Moral
Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 177 (1994).
40. Indeed I have criticized other Justices that Farber and Sherry believe
represent the moderate middle of our legal and cultural discourse. See
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., An Open Letter from One Black Scholar to Ruth
Bader Ginsburg: Or How Not To Become Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 1
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 21 (1994) [hereinafter Culp, Open Letter); Culp,
supra note 22; Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Understanding the Racial
Discourse of Justice Rehnquist, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 597 (1994).
41. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, CriticalRace Theory: An
AnnotatedBibliography,79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of
America: Accent, AntidiscriminationLaw, and a Jurisprudencefor the Last
Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991).
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42
There are other silly points of distortions in this book. I
will not address them, but I believe every word by Farber and
Sherry must be read through the lens of distortion.

III. WHITE LIKE US: ENGAGEMENT AND WHITE
SUPREMACY
The author is Richard Delgado, who claims to be a member of, and a
spokesman for, a group that he calls "people of color." The group
seems to be more a state of mind than a race. I have met Professor
Delgado. He is as pale as I am, has sharply etched features in a long
face, speaks unaccented English, and, for all that appears upon
casual acquaintance, could be a direct descendant of Ferdinand and
Isabella. He lives and teaches, contentedly so far as I know, in an
"Enlightenment-based democracy," namely the United States.
whiteness lends an Evelyn Waugh touch to critical race
Delgado's
43
theory.

An important issue for the law is can good people do racist,
sexist, homophobic or other bad things. Some years ago I
pointed out that in an article published in the Duke Law
Journal Richard Posner committed a racist act. The act I
spoke of was the exercise of his white privilege to ignore the
words and actions of scholars of color. I pointed out that Judge
Posner wrote about critical race theory without having read or
engaged our project. I also noted that his article assumed a
racist construct of what a black person was. Judge Posner
claimed the right to apply a white gaze to identity and to
decide for all of us who is black and who is white.
As Adrienne Davis has shown in other contexts, this use of
white perspectives to determine race is part of the structure of

42. I do not say all problems in our society are the product of white
people. Derrick Bell's interest convergence hypothesis is only a small [but
important] deviation from public choice theory of the law and economics
movement, not any more dangerous than that theory is. Cabrini Green is a
housing project in a city where Northwestern University and the University of
Chicago are important landowners and important political forces. Much of
the urban policy (housing, crime and drugs) that led to the creation of Cabrini
Green was invented by academics at these institutions. In such a context, I
believe it is fair to say that Cabrini Green is connected to those institutions
(in an unpublished talk that they cite without permission). Stanley Fish is
not a postmodernist but a deconstructionist and there is a difference. It is as
if they looked at the work that they disagree with and simply made up what
they wanted it to say.
43. Posner, supra note 12, at 41.
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white supremacy in the law.44 I mentioned that I was not
claiming that Judge Posner was Bull Connor turning water
hoses on black people in the South, but I emphasized that his
actions were part and parcel of a program of exclusion that was
based in the privileged position from which he self-righteously
wrote. I did not mean this as an ad hominem attack on Judge
Posner, but as a direct engagement of his arrogance that I saw
rooted in unexamined racism. I made it again in another
article to which he was given an opportunity to respond, but he
declined. 45 As we approach the end of this century it is
surprising that one of our most influential federal judges and
intellectual forces in the legal academy would not understand
that the discussion of Professor Delgado's race in the quote
from Judge Posner at the beginning of this section is both
wrong and racist. Judge Posner seems to not understand that
race cannot be discerned simply by physical examination. It is
the physical side of his criticism of people of color stated above
for not being Cohn Powell.
Judge Posner, having met Richard Delgado, seems
confident that he is neither biologically nor culturally a person
of color because he looks white or speaks with "unaccented"46
English. He has examined the corridors of the American legal
academy and decided that the scholars of color are not
authentic enough. As I pointed out in my original article and
then in a follow-up article, this exercise of power is racist. It is
racist in its assumption about the social meaning of race for
scholars of color, and it is racist in reading inauthenticity into
anyone who fails to meet his definition of a "real" black person.
What can it possibly mean to Judge Posner to not see someone
as culturally black? Is someone not culturally black if they
have a college education, listen to Japanese music, or marry a
nonblack person? Is a person black if they are gay/lesbian!
bisexual or economically successful? What does Judge Posner
mean by his cultural imperialism? No answers are provided

44. See Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes Part One: Playing in the Light,
45 AM. U. L. REV. 695, 705 (1996).
45. See Culp, supra note 28, at 261.
46. What does accented mean in this context? Since now all five
constitutional officers first in line to be President are from the South, do they
speak with an accent or do those of us not from the South have unaccented
speech? See generally Matsuda, supra note 41 (arguing that Title VII should
apply to accent cases).
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when he shifts to this exercise of white supremacy, because no
answers are needed.
I know that Judge Posner is now Chief Judge of the
Seventh Circuit, but his words speak for themselves. The
criticism of Judge Posner's actions created a certain stir in the
profession. It clearly irritates Professors Farber and Sherry
and at least one other professor has tried to publicly criticize
me for this point.47 They implicitly contend that the charge is
both ridiculous and outside the civility required of academic
discourse. So it is particularly interesting that in reviewing
their book that Judge Posner commits almost exactly the same
act of both dismissal and nonengagement that I criticize him
for in his earlier article. 48 His actions still are racist despite
his high stature and keen intellect. The point I want to make
about this is not to educate Judge Posner. The reason I note
Judge Posner's racism is to contend that it is possible for good
people and-I assume that Judge Posner is such a good
person-to commit racist acts. Is it now possible to speak of
the unspeakable inside the legal academy? Unfortunately,
racism has become after the internment of formal Jim Crow
unspeakable. Once we reduce aspects of formal racial inequality
it is not possible to raise the issue of even one racist act by one
federal judge without committing a form of civility suicide
within the academy.
Many people differ with me about what racism is, and
others cannot see the racism on the surface of the privileged
claims of Judge Posner. To the liberal majority in the academy
and on the bench, racism is believing in a very simplistic way
in the superiority of your race. In this view David Duke and
Louis Farrakhan are always racist, and Ronald Reagan,
Jimmy Carter, Antonin Scalia, Jerome Culp, and Judge Posner
never are. It is a view that I characterize as Mother Theresa
cannot be racist or sexist or homophobic because she loves
humankind. This view of racism is the narrowest way to
understand it and it removes from analysis any person who is
a "good" person. The problem with that formulation is that it
permits hidden racist attitudes to be unexamined for their

47. Jonathan Macey, Remarks at a Duke University Federalist Society
meeting (Spring 1997).

48. See generally Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy
and Racial Difference: White Authority in the Legal Academy, 41 DUKE L.J.
1095 (1992); Culp, supra note 28, at 228-29.
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Racism that

occurs now-this moment-is something disconnected from the
history of our country that produced it. Current racist acts in
this view are not connected to slavery, the slave codes, the end
of reconstruction, Jim Crow, the Tulsa riots, the Scotsboro
Boys, Anti-Chinese statutes, Emmitt Till, the Ku Klux Klan,
segregation of black and Chicano children in the South and
Southwest and California or anything else in our long history
of racial and gender oppression.
Judge Posner's statements about who is a person of color
are not racist in the former sense of the word. He is a good
person, appropriately educated at places that should teach us
that notions of racial superiority are out of place. But the point
of Judge Posner's commentary on Richard Delgado and critical
race theory in general is about a notion of racial privilege that
is part and parcel of a larger construction of race and racism.
If we look only at the goodness of the people and not at what
they do, we cannot examine our own racism. All our actions
should be subject to review-Judge Posner's and those of
critical race theorists. The point of this fact is that it means
that we do not get beyond racism by becoming good people. We
get beyond racism by not committing new racist acts, by
understanding its history, and by altering the social structures
that support its reproduction.
I do not contend and do not believe that because someone
commits a racist act that everything they do is racist, but
neither do I believe that single acts of nonracism remove
people from potential criticism. I am not offended that Farber
and Sherry raise the issue of anti-Semitism about my work. I
believe anti-Semitism is still real and sometimes very
important in aspects of contemporary America, and if Farber
and Sherry can show that some words or actions of mine are
part and parcel of anti-Semitism I will do my best to admit
error and try to change. Unfortunately (or perhaps more
properly fortunately), in their article and the book chapter they
do not explain how criticism of existing meritocratic standards
is anti-Semitism because some Jews and some Asians do well.
This argument would mean that criticism of existing
meritocratic standards is anti-black because some blacks do
well under them.49 Under Farber and Sherry's view of the
49. For additional criticism of this argument in terms of their own
worldview, see Peter Margulies, Inclusive and Exclusive Virtues: Approaches
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world, as long as merit is not purely racially or religiously or
ethnically based it is not challengeable. Their argument
ultimately fails for the simple reason that one exception is not
enough to disprove the larger point.
I do want to challenge those who disagree with my
challenge of Judge Posner to engage my argument. Is it racist
to ignore what scholars of color are saying? Is it racist to
attribute a form of skin-based racial essentialism to race and to
decide from the comforts of one's judicial chambers how people
Is it racist to construct an
are racially constructed?
essentialist view of people of color that makes them "just"
welfare recipients and gang members? There may be a defense
of Judge Posner's earlier argument about race. Neither Judge
Posner nor his defenders have made it. They have thought to
simply ignore his actions and focus on my "incivility" in raising
the issue of the potential racism of his words. If there is a
nonracist explanation for these words, present it. I never
contended that Judge Posner was off personally insulting black
people on street corners (and I did not expect to find it on the
pages of The New Republic), but unfortunately for them there
are people of color who are impacted by Judge Posner's
decisions as Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit and by others
who share his views in their decisions in law classrooms and
courtrooms. Who knows when he or they will decide someone
is not "black" enough or doesn't speak with enough of an accent
to be considered a person of color.
The most important problem with the Farber and Sherry
response to critical race theory is that it claims to engage
without doing so. Farber and Sherry have defined away the
need to respond by distorting what we have written into an
altered vision. They have simply ignored important arguments
about the law and race. They don't exist for Farber and Sherry
and in many ways they don't exist for the legal academy. I do
not believe we can move the racial situation in America if we
fail to engage in a real process of giving up that privilege of
nonengagement. If Farber and Sherry believe that Justice
O'Connor's racial jurisprudence is just, explain how that
jurisprudence deals with my charge that it provides no method

to Identity, Merit, and Responsibility in Recent Legal Thought, 46 OATH. U. L.
REV. 1109, 1125-29 (1997); see also ROBERT HAYMAN, JR., THE SMART
CULTURE: SOCIETY, INTELLIGENCE, AND LAW 253-306 (1998).
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for a change in the racial status quo.50 If law can achieve some
simplistic notion of universal objectivity then Farber and Sherry
should respond to Patricia Williams' cogent interrogation of
knowledge inside the legal academy and the law.5' It is clear
that Farber and Sherry are incapable of taking on that task.
Like the scientific defenders of a discredited theory they have
nothing left inside their intellectual cupboard. The question is
will the rest of the legal academy find comfort in the privileged
position adopted by Farber and Sherry of not dealing honestly
with the real challenges to the legal academy of how it treats
race.
Can privilege be rejected? To reject the privilege of course
does not mean acceptance of all that I or other critical race
theorists have written. We may be wrong, confused, even
racist, but the examination of that requires real engagement.
The appropriate rules for that engagement require that
authors actually attempt that difficult task. Farber and Sherry
claim they do that, but the simple truth is that they cannot
because to do so would put them at a privilege disadvantage and
they are unwilling to ever admit that possibility.
An unexpected fact discovered by psychologists about the
clinically depressed is that they usually tend to have a better
grasp on reality than those who are not depressed. Psychologists term this realistic depression. The "happy" ignore the
many obstacles in their lives and find happiness. Now with the
invention of several psychotropic drugs it apparently is
possible to deliver that happy view of life to everyone. In
combination with some diet drugs it is apparently possible to
achieve both happiness and thinness at the same time. Part of
the obstacle to critical race theory is that, like the depressed,
many of us see the world as it is without the comfort of induced
happiness. We deny that the world is fine and we question
whether it is getting better racially. When critical race theory
sees that race matters we speak its name. The Farbers and
Sherrys, Richard Posners, and Alex Kozinskis of this world
suggest that if we ignore that racial reality we can be happy.
Don't worry, just be happy. This drug of racial ignorance and
the insignificance of the reality of that racial reality is
supposed to create racial harmony.

50. See Culp, Open Letter, supra note 40, at 31-34.
51. See generally PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS (1991).
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We can drug ourselves out of this state so that we are no
longer aware of its reality or we can change it. We can reason
together without dealing with our racial past. Unfortunately,
as some recent evidence has suggested, these psychotropic
drugs seem to have unforeseen side effects. It may be that
such legal psychotropic drugs will also have a potentially
devastating impact on our lives. What critical race theory
suggests is that we have the ability to face our racial reality,
eliminate racial depression, and create a better world with
respect to race, class, gender, and sexual orientation without
imbibing the legal and political drugs of acceptance. The
acceptance of the status quo by individuals may be reasonable,
even necessary, for individual psychological health. However,
it ought to be obvious that such acceptance is not necessary for
society as a whole. The most likely rationale for not dealing
with reality is an acceptance about the inability to create real
change because of some inherent white superiority. It is that
belief in this form of white supremacy that critical race theory
rejects in law and legal scholarship and that implicitly Farber
and Sherry and Posner and Kozinski accept.
IV. REASON, TRUTH AND JUSTICE: OR MAMA DON'T
LET YOUR CHILDREN GROW UP TO BE
"LAW PROFESSORS"?
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry argue that those of us
who have come to be called critical race theorists want to
destroy reason. However, in their 143-page book there is no
clear definition of exactly what they mean by reason. They
suggest that reasoned argument explains the Supreme Court's
decisions in Brown v. Boardof Education, Gideon v. Wainwright,
INS v. Chadha,and TVA v. Hill.52 They don't, however, defend
these opinions from the questioning of critical race scholars,
feminists, or their numerous critics in the legal academy who
hold very different perspectives. The opinions they cite are
supposed to prove the power of pure reason to produce judicial
decisions that do good. Now I might point out that if reason
explains Brown, Gideon, or Chadha, what explains Buck v.
Bell, Korematsu, Bowers v. Hardwick, or Hernandez v. Texas?
Is it that self-same reason or are the bad, the racist or sexist
cases that more than dot our constitutional past the product of

52. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 6.
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I could go
irrational jurists or unreasoning plaintiffs or ....
on, but the point ought to be clear. This is not a book that
thinks it has to prove difficult claims by argument, but this
book instead relies on fiat.
In the world of Farber and Sherry our job as law professors
is to celebrate the Supreme Court's greatness and criticize only
at the margins.53 In the real world with disinterested reason,
the argument that the Supreme Court is good because it
produces good opinions based upon reason must be defended.
What explains this unexplained and undefined reliance on
reason? One cannot find it in this book, but one of the authors
has expanded the argument made in the pages of the book in
an article in the Georgetown Law Review. The article, entitled
The Sleep of Reason, 4 argues that most (all? many? the article
is unclear on the number) critical race scholars do not subscribe to reasoned argument. This argument at first suggested
that Farber and Sherry-or at least Sherry-believe in pure
reason and rational thought as the last defense of intellectual
investigation. This kind of rational argument is described by
Michael Oakeshott in the following way:
[Tihe Rationalist... stands (he always stands) for independence of
mind on all occasions, for thought free from obligation to any
He is the enemy of
authority save the authority of "reason" ....
authority, of prejudice, of the merely traditional, customary or
habitual. His mental attitude is at once skeptical and optimistic...
because the Rationalist never doubts the power of his "reason" (when
properly applied) to determine the worth of a thing, the truth of an

53. An excellent example of this celebratory rhetoric is Suzanna Sherry,
All the Supreme Court Really Needs To Know it Learned from the Warren
Court, 50 VAND. L. REV. 459 (1997). Professor Sherry argues that the
Rehnquist Court has been wrongly criticized for a continuation of the notions
of color blindness and First Amendment jurisprudence of the Warren Court.
The "postmodern" criticism of judicial and legal neutrality is at the base of
this misperception of the Rehnquist Court. But see Barry Friedman, Neutral
Sherry
Principles: A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503 (1997).
mischaracterizes the Court's equal protection jurisprudence and misstates the
history of neutrality in legal constitutional discourse. The argument, for
example, that the Court's current trend toward absolute color-blindness is
simply a continuation of the jurisprudence of the Warren Court ignores the
extent to which the court limited that view of the law to certain areas. The
O'Connor Court's jurisprudence of extending color-blindness to redistricting
cases and to congressional efforts to rectify our history of discrimination is
clearly new. Sherry misunderstands cases like Gomillion. See generally
Culp, supra note 39.
54. Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453,455 (1996).
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opinion or the propriety of an action. Moreover, he is fortified by a
belief in a reason common to all mankind, a common power of
rational consideration, which is the ground and inspiration of
argument ...- I-'

But as I will show, Suzanna Sherry rejects this view of reason
as being impractical. She argues that "reasoned" argument is:
First, I mean to include pragmatism, or practical reason, within the
definition [of reason]: pure ratiocination is not the only form that
reasoning can take....
In some ways, it is easier to describe what reason is by explaining
what it is not. To be reasonable, an argument... cannot be illogical.
It need not be entirely provable by scientific experiment, but it
cannot be inconsistent with everything science and the social sciences
know about reality-until and unless that reality is experimentally
proven wrong. Reasoned appeals need not be fully successful, but if
they convince no one except those who are already believers, they are
probably flawed. Nor are common human emotions entirely excluded.
But neither appeals to power nor "strategic arguments designed to
persuade [primarily] by their emotional effect on the listener" are
consistent with reasoned argument. Reason also stands on its own:
role should
neither the identity of the speaker nor her institutional
56
be relevant to the persuasiveness of an argument.

Sherry clearly rejects the older version of pure reason
advocated by scholars over the years both before and after the
Enlightenment. Sherry is going to bow to some tradition [she
doesn't say what or how, though later she disclaims religion]
and she is going to "sometimes use" scientific method and
sometimes not. She claims that she finds reason in practical
reason, but she does not define that, and her only definition
seems to be to point to Judge Posner and Professor Frank
Michelnan of Harvard Law School who use this middle way
against the extremists who don't.
Her version of reason seems to have four requirements.
First, reason requires in legal settings that those who are
opposed to the status quo prove that it is wrong. In the world
of Farber and Sherry the burden of proof is on those who seek
change. This is what I will call the status quo assumption.
The second argument is that reason cannot be affected by
identity. Reason-practical reason as used by the traditional
legal academy-is free of all aspects of identity or status or
class. It is a product of some universal individuality. This
55. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS
5-6 (New and expanded ed. 1991).
56. Sherry, supra note 54, at 456.
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assumption I shall call the identity assumption. Third, she
claims that to be reasonable you must always speak to
persuade the majority. Now she doesn't quite claim this but
what she says is that if you are only speaking to the already
converted that is not sufficient, and she also argues that the
majority of the country is reasonable and sensible and being
attacked by the extremes. I call this assumption the majority
rules hypothesis. Finally, Sherry argues that to be reasonable
arguments have to be free of "too" much emotion. Emotion that
persuades leads to totalitarianism and the holocaust and must
be stopped at all costs. I might say at this point that maybe
more emotion might have persuaded Nazi Germany. Certainly
detached reason was not enough and there was reason (evil,
monstrous, and ugly reason, to be sure, but reason nonetheless) in all that Nazi Germany did and (powerful and
dispassionate) reason that unsuccessfully opposed it. This
assumption I will call the emotionless assumption.
Farber and Sherry suggest in their book that critical race
theorists in the heart of their work reject these four
assumptions and therefore are "unreasoning" participants in
the legal academy. They are in short just storytelling radical
obstructivists and believers in the unbelievable. I will talk
about the nature of some of the distortions in my and other
scholars' work that leads them to this conclusion in the next
section, but I want to examine these four assumptions in light
of the claim by Sherry (and Farber?) that those who reject
them are irrational unreasoning scholars.
I of course cannot hope to speak for all or necessarily most
critical race theories or theorists, but my reading of critical
race theory suggests that the vast majority of critical race
theorists reject the majority assumption and the status quo
assumption. The point of those two assumptions is to make it
extremely difficult for those who seek change to accomplish it.
If before you can alter society you must prove that the existing
racial structure is wrong that slows down change, but is that
assumption irrational? If you are standing in Virginia in 1837
and you cannot persuade the majority of white male voters that
slavery is wrong does that make your argument irrational? I
would argue these two assumptions at their heart are about
protecting the racial status quo. 57 Since the essence of critical

57. I made this point in one of my first critical race theory articles. See
Culp, supra note 2, at 87-97.
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race theory is to reject that status quo many of us reject these
assumptions. Does that mean we have given up on reasoned
argument or trying to persuade people of the need for change?
The answer is no. If the question is, does critical race theory
seek to shift to the establishment the burden of defending
itself, the answer at least by me is yes. Is that argument
irrational? Certainly the establishment has had a difficult
time defending its existing structures.
How do you defend the tests in Washington v. Davis, the
decision in Bowers, or the rule in Korematsu, the failure to
apply prior principles in McCleskey, or the reasoning in Shaw
v. Reno? The court ultimately simply responds that we the
white majority have the power to do what we want in these
cases.
Farber and Sherry claim practical reason, but I believe the
heart of that practical reason is simply that the status quo is
good. Farber and Sherry don't prove that point, probably
cannot prove that point, but if the status quo has no burden to
defend itself, it will often win whether it is right or not.
Critical race theory rejects that placid assumption about
the racial status quo. We look at our country's racial history
and we do not see benign progress. There is evidence to
support our position and I would argue less to support Farber
and Sherry's position, but this is not an argument about reason
or rationality. Now Farber and Sherry might claim that any
process that removes these assumptions about the status quo
is so indeterminate that by definition law collapses to
questions of power. Power is always involved in aspects of law,
but because power is involved does not mean that we cannot
argue with reason about what justice and equality require.
Farber and Sherry seem mystified by the status quo assumption in their
response to this article. They seem to think that putting the burden on those
who seek change is required by logic, not politics. This assumption is part of
the defense of our existing racial status quo. You do not have to agree with my
rejection of that assumption, but you cannot claim that you are not defending
the status quo when you make it. The emphasized part of the previous
sentence should put to rest Farber and Sherry's claim that we believe we are
beyond criticism. This is not a fight, despite their description about personal
slights or rational thought. This is a fight about first principles. Farber and
Sherry believe that society is "pretty good," not perfect, but pretty good, and
that those of us who wish to change it must start where they are in terms of
racial reality if we wish to challenge that reality. We differ on that first
principle. It is their stubbornness on that point that is beyond criticism. I am
happy to begin by acknowledging that I do not accept that view, but still
believe that I am a "rational" person.
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The point of critical race theory is that the status quo
assumption about race is not just. One cannot hide that
argument behind supposed rationality or cries of indeterminacy.
Justice is a complicated issue and racial justice has been
difficult to achieve. I am willing to argue about what that
justice means, but I will not accept the description of racial
justice because it has been tradition, or because mainly white
and prejudiced Supreme Court judges decide it is so.
I claim the reasoned and reasonable right to challenge
those assumptions.
Farber and Sherry-if they are to
persuade me-have to deal with the real issues of racial justice
raised by the critical race theory project. Now Farber and
Sherry can ignore me and critical race scholars, feminists, and
queer theorists who do not accept their assumptions by
appealing as they do in this book to the largely white male
judiciary and legal academy to simply ignore our challenge as
unreasoned emotion. Such an approach does a disservice to
the important work done by Charles Lawrence, 58 Neil Gotanda,
Paulette Caldwell, Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, Frank
Valdes, Dorothy Roberts, 59 Robert Chang,60 Richard Delgado,
and Jerome Culp-to name just a few.
Many critical race theorists do believe that identity
matters. The problem for Farber and Sherry's argument is
that they do not agree on exactly how it matters. I would say
that my colleagues' writing on the notion of identity has made
me less essentialist than I was when I started writing about
race, but the point that is true about critical race theory is
that, while we believe identity matters, we do not subscribe to
some simple notion of identity politics. The funny thing about
this assumption is that Farber and Sherry don't subscribe to it
either in at least two ways. Throughout the book they keep
describing the various identities of people who disagree with
critical race theory. Clarence Thomas is black and a Supreme
Court justice, Jim Chen is a native of Taiwan and a fellow law
professor at Minnesota, Randall Kennedy is black and a
Harvard law professor, Stephen Carter is black and a Yale law

58. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, HI, The Id, the Ego, and Equal

Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
59. See, e.g., DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE,
REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997).
60. See, e.g., ROBERT CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, THE LAW,
AND THE NATION STATE (NYU Press, forthcoming 1999).
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professor, Richard Posner is a judge on the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, my colleague Kate Bartlett is a reasonable
feminist (which I assume means being a reasonable female),
Martha Minow is a multiculturalist-but reasonable.
The race and gender of those seen as opponents or even
fellow travelers of critical race theory seem to matter to the
argument of Farber and Sherry when they disagree with
critical race theory in the opinion of Farber and Sherry. This
concession to identity grows out of the move from pure reason
Once Farber and Sherry no longer
to practical reason.
subscribe to some simplistic notion of pure reason and
tradition and practical issues matter, then of course status and
identity matter. Farber and Sherry's notion of reason does not
meet its own standards. As long as critical race theory is not
saying that all that matters is one's identity-a claim that the
heart of critical race theory long ago rejected 6 1-there is very
little difference between critical race theory and Farber and
Sherry on identity, at least where they criticize identity in
critical race theory. They concede that one can learn from
those who have different experiences. The difference between
Farber and Sherry and most critical race theorists is how much
you can learn from those with different identity. Farber and
Sherry, like most people, are anti-essential essentialist, but so
are most (all) critical race theorists. The question is what
should one be essentialist about and what should one be antiessentialist about. I agree with Farber and Sherry that
practical reason can help one do that, but we disagree on where
that leads. The identity assumption is inconsistent with pure
reason, but once we shift to practical reason identity matters.
The final argument made by Sherry about reason has to do
with emotions. She suggests some emotions are permissible,
but others are not. There are no reasoned explanations for
One
what is appropriate emotion and what is not.
interpretation of her objection to critical race theory is that she
believes that it is inappropriate for racial minorities to use
emotion to persuade the majority that our current racial
situation is wrong. Emotion has always been a factor for many
of those racial minorities in the civil rights movement. There
is more than a little emotion in cases as diverse as Brown,
Plessy, or Bakke. Emotion matters in winning arguments

61. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
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before the Court and in the court of public opinion, and
sometimes pure reason, in order to be practical, needs the
discipline of some appropriate emotion.
Let us return to Farber and Sherry's argument that pure
reason-is that practical reason-is behind Brown. This is an
odd argument by constitutional law experts who have to know
that Brown has been criticized precisely because, it has been
argued, it was not reasoned enough. Is Brown the reasoning
result of a 200-year-old gradual process of getting closer and
closer to the universal good or is Brown the unreasoning shift
from separate but equal? Nothing in this book helps us
understand that question or the appropriate answer. If Farber
and Sherry had read with any care the words that a number of
critical race theorists have written on this subject, they would
not need to attack the straw claim of irrationality. As I look
back at the articles I have written about law and race, I do see
emotion. Indeed, in urging scholars of color to do research I
have suggested that they find the anger within and use that
anger to make change. 62 Is it possible that anger could get in
the way of "rational" debate? Maybe. However, Farber and
Sherry have shown no examples of that possibility. Their real
point is that there is nothing for people like me to be angry
about. In reviewing their book Judge Posner put it this way:
Instead of exemplifying in their careers the potential of members of
their groups for respected achievement in the world outside the
ghetto of complaint-the kind of exemplification that we find in the
career of Colin Powell-critical race theorists teach by example that
the role of a member of a minority group is to be paid a comfortable
professional salary to write childish stories about how awful it is to
be a member of such a group. 63

The point seems to be that the emotion is wrong because
the picture is so rosy both for people of color in general and
those of us in the legal academy in particular. This can be seen
in Judge Posner's visceral reaction to our speaking as members
of communities of color. When Judge Posner suggests that
Richard Delgado and the rest of us have nothing in common
with "the drug pusher in Harlem or a teenage mom in south
Central," he is factually wrong. Many of us have our right to
get on a plane, approach a border, or walk down a street
62. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Firing Legal Canons and Shooting
Blanks: Finding a Neutral Way in the Law, 10 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 185
(1991).
63. Posner, supra note 12, at 42.
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hindered, denied, or affected because officials see us as a drug
pusher from Harlem, an alien un-American figure in their
midst, or a Mexican trying to imitate real Americans. But
there is a greater sense in which Judge Posner and Farber and
Sherry are wrong about racial identity; those of us in critical
race theory do not see our racial contemporaries as simply
"other." Most of us see a connection between us and those
individuals and communities of color in our society. Many of
us live in or participate in many activities in such communities. Many of us feel direct personal connections to the
people of color who have not been as economically fortunate as
we. Most of us have connections to welfare and drug abuse
that many white people do not have because of the racial
income structure of our society. Some of us, while not being
teenagers, are in fact unwed mothers in South Central Los
Angeles. The truth of the matter is that for us in critical race
theory our connection to the many communities of color are
real and important. What critical race theory has started to do
is to use the emotion of those connections to try to create legal
and political change. It is that alteration in the status quo that
is at issue.
V. DARKNESS VS. LIGHT
Social constructionism is an attack on the modem conception of
Reason, and anti-Semitism is one of the first monsters produced
when Reason dozes off....
... Largely politically progressive, radical multiculturalism includes
adherents of a broad assortment of theories, including critical race
theory, radical feminism, and... "gaylegal" theory.... This motley
group is united primarily by their rejection of the aspiration to
universalism and objectivity that is the fruit of the European
Enlightenment. Reality, they suggest, is subjective and socially
constructed."

Farber and Sherry claim that they are upholders of the
Enlightenment project against the uncivilized hordes of
postmodern attack on the legal academy. In doing so they
attack all the post-theoretical projects of the last twenty-five
years. Much of their intellectual fire is directed at Stanley
Fish-who, despite their claims, is not part of the postmodern
move proper, but instead a part of the deconstructive and post64. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 4-5.
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structuralist movement in the academy. With so much fire and
so little light directed in multiple directions it is easy to see
why they fail to capture critical race theory. I will try to
restate what I believe they are attempting to write in this book
and in their articles. The Enlightenment project to Farber and
Sherry is a product of three things. Knowledge is produced by
scientific investigation and rational debate about truth. Truth
is partial in that we cannot know everything, but we can know
more and get closer to universal truth as we investigate the
universe. These universal truths could be discussed if known
in some language that was objective and free of any political
power. This knowledge allows the construction of neutral and
objective rules for the treatment of people. These neutral and
objective rules are the product of some universal notion of
justice and equality. There is a sense of celebration and selfcongratulatory nature to this notion of the Enlightenment
project. It has a religious quality to it. The United States as
the best and most important and most just society is an
assumed truth. One cannot hear in this view of the Enlightenment an understanding that our society has more crime and
more poverty than other industrialized societies. One can only
understand the heart of their criticism of critical race theory
right at the point that black people, the foremost benefactors of
the freedom created by the Enlightenment project in the
United States, seem to not appreciate what they have gained.
The Enlightenment has cut your chains and you ungracious
black people do not have the intellectual firepower to be
thankful.
There are two points to make at the beginning. This
statement of the Enlightenment project has already adjusted
itself from the purest claims of universal rationality, objectivity
and universalism of an earlier period. The Enlightenment
project has been changed by the postmodern, poststructuralist, and deconstructivist movements.
The postmodern movement among other things has attempted to alter
the place of the subject in art, literature, and law. It has
attacked and advocated the use of narratives and tried to put
humanistic aspects of life back into art. The view of the
Enlightenment project envisioned by Farber and Sherry is
post-rational and more humaistic. They understand that the
feminist project alters some of the contours of the model of
knowledge and rationality, but they cannot admit it. They are
like the former rulers of the Soviet Union who claimed to be
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successors of Marx and Engel, but who governed more like the
oligarchy of the Roman Empire. When they accept practical
reason in place of pure reason they have become in their own
view at least children of the twilight and not children of the
pure light.
The second point to note is that Farber and Sherry are
inconsistent in their rejection of parts of the standard
Enlightenment project. Do they want to argue for a notion of
objectivity that takes all the context out of our experiences?
They attack critical race theorists for "supposedly" attacking
black conservatives in ways that exclude their remarks, but in
a world where identity does not matter at all in constructing
the objective reality, why should it matter if they wrongly 65
think that Stephen Carter or Clarence Thomas have been
silenced.
In other places they have criticized critical race theory for
injecting the personal and the unimportant into the discussion
of race. Identity matters when Farber and Sherry say it does
and nowhere else. Part of the project of critical race theory has
been to argue that with respect to that knowledge is contingent
and a product of the people who are constructing the
knowledge. So for many in critical race theory law can be
apparently objective, rational, universal and racially unfair.
The objectivity is chimerical, the rationality is dependent and
the universality is simply nonexistent.
One example is the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. In RAV the Court examined whether a Minneapolis
ordinance that criminalized "hate speech" violated the First
Amendment. A unanimous Court held that the ordinance was
unconstitutional as drafted. They concluded that the ordin-

65. I say wrongly by any standard. Professors Stephen Carter and
Randall Kennedy are frequently published in the best law reviews and have
several books published by important publishers. They frequent the news
pages of our major papers and are seen on the most illustrious panels and
seminars. Professor Kennedy has a well-funded magazine that he publishes
to reflect his views of the world. Justice Clarence Thomas is one of nine
people in one of three branches of the federal government of the most
significant economic and military power of our time. These are not people
who are silenced by the certainly less visible members of critical race theory.
In addition, as I have mentioned in other places, I think the view of the
opinions of Professors Carter and Kennedy does not fit a neat, simple
structure. So I am not sure it is fair to call them conservatives or pure
defenders of the racial status quo.
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ance was not content-neutral because it penalized the white
teenager who burned a cross on the lawn of a black family for
his hate speech. The Court concluded that racial hatred had a
right to be protected as speech. The rule in RAV appears to be
neutral-all hate speech is now free to be uttered-but there
are other neutral rules that are rational, neutral and more
protective of the lives of black and white citizens of St. Paul,
Minnesota. The ordinance that the Court held unconstitutional was content-neutral as to hate speech-the speech of
a white racist or a black racist or an Asian racist all potentially
would have violated the ordinance. The ordinance is speechneutral because it does not elevate some kinds of issues to a
special place. It is not in that sense black race-sensitive or
people of color race-sensitive. The Court held that in order to
create free speech we must empower the militias to be able to
use hate speech or else the law is no longer content-neutral,
but the point is that there are lots of neutral positions that the
law can take. It is not that the one chosen is unreasonable, but
it is not inevitable, required, or in my view just. It makes our
citizens of color subject to a whole host of dangers, including
the pure speech of walking onto my property and burning a
cross on it. The real issue is whether that speech deserves the
opprobrium of this ordinance and hiding behind contentneutrality to figure out racial justice does not do it.
Similar arguments could be made about the Court's
jurisprudence in Title VII, where the neutral rule about what
is personal does not seem to apply equally to the black
employee of a prison system and a white female employee of a
school district. The Court in Hicks asks whether there is any
possible reason for race to not be the rationale for a black male
being fired, and the Third Circuit in Taxman refuses to see
that any reason but race could explain this decision. Race is
nowhere in Hicks and everywhere in Taxman and the Court's
rationality and neutrality and objectivity is always in place. 66
One way to understand the Enlightenment project is as an
effort to open the creation of and interrogation of knowledge to
people who have ideas to contribute. What critical race theory
has demonstrated is that the lives of people of color and our
perspectives on the world can alter how knowledge is under-

66. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Small Numbers, Big Problems, Black
Men, and the Supreme Court: A Reform Programfor Title VII After Hicks, 23
CAP. U. L. REv. 241 (1994).
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stood. The hope that there is some place outside society where
the rational, neutral, objective person can stand and evaluate
justice does not exist, but in a practical world we can if we
choose listen to what people are saying.
The Enlightenment did not mean to provide the power of a
small elite to control knowledge or to leave out the real lives of
people who do not have power. Some forms of democratic
desire are crucial and the heart of the project of critical race
theory. We are all children of that part of the light of
Enlightenment just as we are all also products of the important
truths about representation, language, and power of postmodernism and post-structuralism and deconstructive projects.
67
It is not possible inside this paper to go through that history.
How critical race has adopted other aspects of postmodern and
post-structural projects is a very complicated process, but the
heart of that project is to put the human lives of people of color
into the legal discourse.
It is important to remember that if the heart of
Enlightenment is to question, that is exactly what most of
what critical race theory has done and, given the opportunity,
will continue to do. The Enlightenment project of Farber and
Sherry is not one that I would subscribe to or most of the
intellectual world does subscribe to outside the political salons
of The New Republic or the ManhattanReview. The power to
get their position in the New York Times or The New Republic
or in the words of important federal judges does not make the
ideas expressed or the interpretations of law and critical race
theory right or just.
Finally, there is in Farber and Sherry's argument a
standard response to the post-theoretical criticism of neutrality
and objectivity. The argument has two parts. The first part of
the response is to say that it is not possible to argue if the
fruits of the Enlightenment are not accepted. The second part
of the argument is that if neutral rules are not sought law has
no purpose and we have collapsed justice and law into pure
power. The first part of the argument proves too much. People
argued before the Enlightenment and lots of societies have
reasoned discussions even if they are not recognized as such
outside the West. The argument also avoids the issue raised
by the postmodern, deconstruction, and post-structuralist and
67. See Robert Chang, Critical Race Theory and Problems of Method
(Draft 1997) (on file with the author).
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post-colonial movements. If there is no place to stand without
a position about power and race, it is not a response to say that
if you do not agree with us about what we think it is important
to discuss, dialogue disappears. Dialogue based upon coerced
agreement is not real dialogue. Agreement about what is
important and what matters is difficult, but when there is no
consensus about what matters there is no other rational place
to begin then to argue about first principles.
EPILOGUE
Our racial past haunts our law and legal scholarship not
unlike the baby ghost in Beloved. In the law it is represented
not by the incorporeal body of disembodied ghosts but instead
by unacknowledgeable privileges buried in the law and in our
scholarship. These privileges are buried in our supposed
neutrality, objectivity, and merit. It is only the privilege of the
largely white majority that allows us to see affirmative action
as the greatest privilege in admissions to higher education,
including law schools. The evidence is quite clear that the
mainly white privilege that exists for alumni children is
numerically more important than any racially sensitive
concern embedded in affirmative action admissions programs.
One would think from the rhetoric of Farber and Sherry, the
Thernstroms, and Ward Connerly that merit is embedded in
the law of the land. The truth is that merit is neither required
by law, mandated by customs, nor embedded in our history.
Those who have successfully ended affirmative action in
California by administrative flat and state referendum did not
require that all decisions for admissions be done based upon
merit. Instead merit has become ignoring race and gender in
coming to a decision.
It is clear, for example, that some racially sensitive
programs have helped employers and colleges and universities
be more sensitive to a wide range of people (nonwhite and
white) who were ignored by traditional procedures. It is also
clear that traditional merit can be used to hide privileges that
do not reflect real merit. Despite the claims made by our
detractors, critical race theorists believe in merit, truth, and
justice. It is impossible to live in a market society and not have
to deal with these issues, but we believe those social
constructions are easy to use to support-sometimes unknowingly-white supremacy.
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Can unacknowledged privilege dwell within the theories of
critical race theorists? Of course. To understand that fact does
not make the privileges equivalent for traditional scholars and
critical race theorists. Anger is always a reactionary response
to real or perceived injuries. Anger in that instance does not
become the equivalent of the long history of subordination and
power embedded in white supremacy, and the claim that it
does amounts to another form of privilege. Sometimes anger
can be simply an inarticulate cry of unchastened emotion that
does not educate, inform or heal.
Is it possible that the anger of critical race theoristsincluding myself-has availed itself of the privilege of the
victim? When the families of the victims of Jeffrey Dahmerparticularly some of the black family members-screamed that
they wanted to kill Dahmer, the reaction may have been about
simply unfathomable desire to achieve retribution. When Marc
lass says that his daughter's killer should die, it may be that
it amounts to a form of atavistic revenge and hurt. When the
black parents of the victims of the Atlanta child murders claim
that the killing was by white people, they may have fallen
victim to the anger of the moment.
Critical race theory has, in my view, missed that trap of
victimhood. Though many may see critical race theorists in the
role of victims, I never have. What I read in the pages of the
long story we are telling about race is a claim of the right to
demand change and to highlight problems in a common society.
We may have been victims of some racial crimes, but we are
not seeking primarily either victim status or an effort to
punish an incorporeal devil, but to deal directly with the
reality of white supremacy in our midst. We demand the right
to participate in the discourse about this society not as the
image of us in the white mind, but in all our reality. The
question is do we sit and weep about the privileges lost or hide
behind protective legal covers from the ghost of our racial past.
It is the job of critical race theory to remind us that that is the
choice we are making.

